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K. G. J. PILLAI*
A MONG the regulatory agencies of the Federal Government,
the Civil Aeronautics Board is conspicuous by its reputation
of being the servant of the industry it is designed to regulate.
Recently, the CAB was described as a "trade association operated
by certain oligopolistic carriers' and as an "imperfect cartel."'
In July 1970 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia stated that the CAB is "unduly oriented toward the
interests of the industry it is designed to regulate, rather than the
public interest it is designed to protect."' If these observations are
accurate, consumers and the traveling public have little chance of
getting regulatory protection from the CAB.
Without jumping to sweeping conclusions certain facts must be
presented to evaluate the performance of the CAB in the area of
consumer protection.
On June 3, 1970, the CAB met privately with airline executives
and discussed international air fares to be negotiated by the United
States carriers during an upcoming traffic conference of the Inter-
national Air Transport Association. The transcript of this ex parte
meeting shows that the Chairman of the CAB made the following
statement:
I would like to remind us all of a very unpleasant reality....
IATA is under heavy pressure, critical pressure by the defenders
of the public in the Congress and many of those who make a pro-
fession of being public defenders. Therefore, perhaps it is needless
*B.A., LL.M., Kerala University, India; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University;
Executive Director of Aviation Consumer Action Project, Washington, D.C.
I A. PHILLIPS, AIR TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 157.
2W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 233 (1970).
'Moss v. C.A.B., 430 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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to remind you that any increases in standard fares which appear
to be devices to cover promotional fares are going to be very hard
for you and for us to defend. I think this may be a very hot summer
for IATA .... I am sorry to lecture you, but I can see some real
clouds and hear some real loud rumblings.'
This statement is indicative of the general attitude of the CAB
toward consumer affairs. First, this statement was made in a meet-
ing convened without public notice or participation. Second, the
statement insinuates that the CAB and the air carriers are in the
same camp and the public defenders are an external source of
nuisance. Third, the chairman suggests that had there been no
public defenders, the CAB would not be as concerned over fare
increases.
As the Chairman of the CAB predicted, the summer of 1970
was extremely hot not only for IATA but for the Board as well.
The incomparable Ralph Nader challenged, for the first time in
twenty-five years, the CAB's practice of rubberstamping exorbitant
international air fares hammered out by IATA's secret price-
fixing conferences.' Nader's speeches and writings stressed the
need for a comprehensive Congressional investigation of the CAB-
IATA relationship.' In the meanwhile, Ralph Nader's public in-
terest lawyers sued the CAB to open up some of its secret files for
public inspection and copying.7 Simultaneously with these unprece-
dented developments, thirty-two Congressmen petitioned the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, seeking to
nullify a six per cent increase in domestic air fares granted by the
CAB as a result of a series of ex parte meetings of the Board with
the representatives of the airline industry.' These Congressmen
unsuccessfully sought the permission of the CAB to participate in
those meetings.' In reversing the CAB's order, the court of appeals
observed that "if Congressmen are excluded from these ex parte
4Transcript of the Conference at 31-32 (June 3, 1970).
'Since 1963, the CAB approved four JATA fare increases on the North At-
lantic routes. See, e.g., CAB Order 72-3-104 (March 30, 1972), which granted
across-the-board increases ranging from six per cent to forty-seven per cent in
the North Atlantic routes.
'See, e.g., Nader, Book Review, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 5, 1970 at D4.
Robertson v. Kiefer, Civil Action No. 3349-69 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 1969).




meetings between the Board and the airlines, ordinary rate-paying
members of the public, or their representatives, would have little
chance indeed to be admitted.' 0
With the emergence of this new comsumerism, the aviation in-
dustry, including the Board, became increasingly consumer-con-
scious. The Chairman of the CAB declared the formation of a
Consumer Advisory Committee.1 A new division was created at the
CAB to deal with consumer complaints.' Several airlines redesig-
nated some of their executives as "vice-president---consumer af-
fairs."'" The Air Transport Association of America, the chief
lobbyist for the scheduled airlines, amassed one million dollars "to
combat consumerism."' These cosmetic measures of protective
reaction were designed more to silence consumer advocates, how-
ever, than to bring about substantive benefits to the traveling
public.
The Chairman of the CAB recently stated that the CAB's Con-
sumer Advisory Committee has been most "productive and pro-
vocative."'" Even though the Board has taken certain minor steps
for the benefit of consumers in response to the recommendations
of the Advisory Committee," it has become clear that the Commit-
tee is absolutely powerless to initiate changes in the basic regulatory
framework of the CAB. For example, the Committee is not per-
mitted to discuss issues or cases pending before the Board.' Ac-
cordingly important items such as rates and fares, airline mergers,
10 Id. at 894 n.12.
"The Consumer Advisory Committee was created in October 1970 pursuant
to Exec. Order No. 11,007, 3 C.F.R. § 573 (1962). Reuben B. Robertson III
(Chairman) and K.G.J. Pillai (Member) are associates of Ralph Nader.
"The C.A.B. Office of Consumer Affairs was created shortly after the cre-
ation of the Consumer Advisory Committee. The Office is headed by the former
director of the C.A.B.'s Bureau of Public Information.
"The most prominent among these are Pan American World Airways and
Eastern Air Lines.
"
4McLeod, Washington Window, WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS, July 1971, at 13.
'$Hearings on S. 1637, S. 1964, and S. 2064 Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
governmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Operations, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1971).
"CAB Docket No. 23310 (SPDR-30, April 23, 1971), in which the Board
initiated rule-making proceedings designed to discourage airlines' practice of dis-
honoring reservations confirmed by telephone.
"See CAB Press Release (Oct. 21, 1970), announcing the creation of the
Consumer Advisory Committee; Minutes of the Meeting of Consumer Advisory
Committee (Dec. 9, 1970).
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intercarrier agreements and route cases are completely excluded
from the Committee's purview. Because of these numerous con-
straints on the scope and jurisdiction of the Committee, some of
its members have long felt the need for establishing an independent
consumer group to represent consumer interests in formal proceed-
ings of the Board.18
The newly-created CAB Consumer Affairs Office1 has also
proved relatively impotent. The CAB has not prescribed any new
regulations to enable the Consumer Office to deal with consumer
grievances effectively. In 1971 the office received complaints from
more than 8,000 consumers20 but the vast majority of them re-
ceived nothing more than letters of regret from that office"' that
usually must pleads lack of authority to settle consumer problems.
In the spring of 1971, Ralph Nader and his associates organized
a new consumer organization called Aviation Consumer Action
Project.2 Thus, for the first time since the Board was created,
there is an action-oriented consumer group capable of transforming
the Board's traditionally ex parte proceedings into an adversary
process. Until this development, the Board's proceedings were
exclusively dominated by the airlines.' Initially, the ACAP's efforts
to intervene in formal proceedings as a full party' were vehemently
18 Both Reuben B. Robertson and Dr. K.G.J. Pillai have expressed this view.
"Unlike the other departments of the CAB, the Consumer Affairs Office has
not been granted "delegated authority" under the Board's Regulations.
20 CAB Press Release (Dec. 31, 1971).
21 A sample survey of 200 complaints received by the CAB Consumers Affairs
Office showed that 180 complaints received regret letters from the CAB. The
survey was conducted by Aviation Consumer Action Project.
22 The ACAP survey, which was based on random selection from the 8,000
complaints received by the CAB in 1971, shows that eighty complainants were
advised of the Board's lack of legal authority to deal with their complaints. Id.
"0Ralph Nader personally contributed 10,000 dollars initially to ACAP.
ACAP has three full-time staff members, two of them are lawyers. Further, more
than a dozen volunteers work for ACAP without remuneration or with nominal
stipends. ACAP is fully sustained by public contributions which in 1972 amounts
to more than 30,000 dollars.
'There has never been consumer participation in the Board's proceedings.
Normally the adversaries in the Board's proceedings are airline parties.
- 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.14, 302.15 (1970). Section 302.14 provides for limited
participation and section 302.15 provides for full participation. Section 302.14
parties do not have the right to cross-examine witnesses or to participate in oral
arguments without ad hoc permission from the Hearing Examiner.
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opposed by the airlines and their trade associations. " The Board's
regulations require a showing of "substantial economic interest"
before a party is allowed to intervene as a full party in the Board's
proceedings." Of course, it is difficult for any consumer group to
establish that it represents the economic interests of an inchoate
mass of air travelers and shippers. In the American-Western
Merger Case," the hearing examiner denied ACAP's petition for
intervention." On review of that order, the Board permitted ACAP
to participate in the case "as a matter of grace."3 ACAP's per-
sistent involvement in numerous issues affecting aviation, however,
finally convinced the Board that the new group is too effective to
be ignored by procedural niceties. During the past three months
ACAP has been granted full party status in five major proceedings
of the Board."
I. DOMESTIC RATE REGULATION AND CONSUMER INTERESTS
The ACAP has as a primary objective the reduction of air fares
for all passengers to bring air travel within the reach of those
millions of our citizens who have never traveled by air." In addi-
tion, this is one of the purposes of the regulatory scheme embodied
in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958." To achieve this purpose
"eSee the Answer filed jointly by Air Transport Association, Air Traffic Con-
ference of America and scheduled air carriers in opposition to ACAP's petition
for leave to intervene in ATC Bylaws Investigation, CAB Docket No. 23542
(July 21, 1971). Specifically, the ATA answer asked, "For whom does ACAP
speak, and under what authority?"
2 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b), (d) (1970).
28 CAB Docket No. 22916 (June 25, 1971).
21 CAB Order No. 71-6-132 (June 25, 1971).
"°CAB Order No. 71-11-43 (Nov. 11, 1971).
31 Airline Industrial Relations Conference Investigation, CAB Docket No.
23267 (April 19, 1972); Student, Youth and Senior-Citizen Fares Investigation,
CAB Docket No. 23780 (Jan. 19, 1972); Liability and Claims Rules Investiga-
tion, CAB Docket No. 19923 (Dec. 27, 1971); ATC Bylaws Investigation, CAB
Docket No. 23542 (Feb. 22, 1972); National-Northwest Merger Case, CAB
Docket No. 23852 (Nov. 22, 1971).
32 The CAB has no statistics to show the percentage of population which
ever utilized the air services. A survey conducted by ACAP volunteers in the
summer of 1971, however, indicates that at least forty per cent of the United
States population has never travelled by air. In this survey ACAP interviewed
500 persons from twenty states.
3349 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970).
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Congress has granted the CAB plenary powers to regulate the rates
and fares of air carriers."
Rates and fares for domestic air transportation can be decided
by the carrier or by the Board.' Whatever the source, these fares
must be included in a "tariff" filed by the air carrier with the
Board."' Consequently, the charging of rates and fares not properly
included in the tariff is illegal per se." The CAB, upon complaint
or upon its own initiative, may change existing fares after notice
and hearing if the fares are found to be unjust, unreasonable or
discriminatory."8 Moreover, the Board is empowered to prescribe
maximum and minimum rates to be charged by air carriers."9 In
determining the just and reasonable rate, the Board is required to
conform to certain statutory criteria enumerated in the Act.' These
criteria include, inter alia, the need for adequate and efficient trans-
portation at "the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such
service.""
The rate regulation of the CAB is often characterized as an
empty legal formality. ' In the vast majority of cases, the CAB
simply adopts carrier-made rates without evaluating their reason-
ableness.'" The carriers informally agree on the same fare levels
and the CAB invariably approves them." In those instances where
the carrier-made rates involve substantial increases, the CAB meets
with representatives of the airline industry in private to decide on
an acceptable amount of fare increase. This practice of granting
fare increases in ex parte meetings has been the subject of public
criticism in recent years." In the Moss case,' the court of appeals
3
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970).
35Id.
81 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 $ 403(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
"T Moss v. C.A.B., 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. 5 1482(d) (1970).
" Id.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 1002(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970).
41 Id.
'See generally W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 57-73 (1970).
"See, e.g., Moss v. C.A.B., 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the
CAB granted fare increases without evaluating their reasonableness.
*1 See generally P. CHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRICE POLICY: A STUDY OF DOMES-
TIC AIRLINE PASSENGER FARES 84-110 (1958).
"E.g., Letter from Congressman Moss of California to CAB Chairman,
March 1972 objecting to this continuing practice.
"430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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condemned this practice as contrary to the statutory rate-making
plan "in that it fences the public out of the rate-making process and
tends to frustrate judicial review.' The Board's procedural irreg-
ularities are largely instrumental in maintaining domestic airline
fares at artificially high levels."'
This collusive rate regulation offers the prospect of perpetuating
the existing high fares indefinitely. This is the area of greatest public
concern. As a result of the challenge to the six per cent general
fare increase granted in 1969, the Board reluctantly instituted a
domestic passenger fare investigation." Before completing the
over-all investigation, however, the Board issued a tentative deci-
sion which granted "interim fare relief" on the ground that "the
carriers require an increase in yield of [twelve per cent] over the
fare levels which existed on October 15, 1970."" The investigation
was used as a springboard to justify existing fare levels and future
increases. The Board simply rearranged the cost and revenue
figures supplied by the airlines in various convenient bureaucratic
molds." Crucial questions such as reduction of airline costs by
elimination of unnecessary promotional expenses and other elements
of mismanagement, reduction of the price of air travel to attract
traffic adequate to fill seats that are presently empty and examina-
tion of the effect of misuse of airline resources for nontransporta-
tion purposes were outside the purview of the investigation.
According to the estimates developed by the CAB's Bureau of
Economics, the reasonable coach fare for the major domestic
routes should not exceed 3.7 cents per revenue passenger mile for
wide-bodied jets." To illustrate this conclusion, the Pacific South-
west Airlines, an intra-state California carrier, which is not regu-
lated by the CAB, actually does offer a fare of 3.7 cents per mile
47 Id. at 893.
4' The Board's procedural irregularities, such as ex parte determination of
rates, prevents the public or other interested parties from making critical analysis
or evaluation of the reasonableness of rates.
4 CAB Order No. 70-1-147 (Jan. 29, 1970).
50CAB Order No. 71-4-59 (April 19, 1971).
51 The CAB never examined the reasonableness of airlines' spending for ad-
vertising, leases and purchases of equipment, source and nature of financial loans
and heavy insurance payments to companies interlocked with airlines.
5 Exhibit No. 4001, Bureau of Economics, CAB Docket No. 21866-9 (Nov.
20, 1970).
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in its Los Angeles-San Francisco short-haul route." In contrast to
this reasonable fare level, the CAB regulated carriers charge 7.5
cents per coach-passenger-mile on the Dallas-Washington, D.C.
route, and 6.6 cents per coach-passenger-mile on the New York-
Los Angeles route." There are several economists who agree that
these fares are grossly unreasonable and that they should be re-
duced by at least one-half.' A substantial reduction in existing
fares is economically possible since World Airways, a charter air-
line, unsuccessfully sought CAB permission to operate scheduled
services between the East Coast and California at a fare of 79.50
dollars or 3.2 cents per mile."
II. INTERNATIONAL FARES
The rates and fares in international air transportation are fixed
by the airlines themselves through the instrumentality of IATA
without CAB regulation.' The IATA rate-making conferences are
not open to governments, not to mention consumers or the press.
In 1971, IATA's secret ratemaking conference in Montreal was
picketed when the airlines denied a request of consumer repre-
sentatives to be present at that conference as observers." The
public's knowledge about IATA conferences is limited to certain
selected documents filed by the carriers with the CAB. These docu-
ments are carefully contrived to transmit distorted and precensored
accounts of arguments and discussions of anonymous carriers, and
do not include important studies, analyses and reports that are
allegedly used as the basis of IATA rate agreements." Moreover,
3 
W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA 122 (1970).
'Calculated on the basis of published tariffs.
"See generally W. JORDAN, AIRLINE REGULATION IN AMERICA (1970); R.
CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS (1962); S. RICHMOND, REGULATION
AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION (1961).
"AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, May 1, 1967, at 27.
'See K. PILLAI, THE AIR NET (1970), for an analysis of the IATA rate-
making system.
"In May 1971, ACAP as well as certain other consumer groups from
Europe made the request. Upon denial, one dozen ACAP volunteers picketed
the Montreal Conference.
"E.g., the minutes of IATA conferences only disclose that certain unidentified
carriers supported a fare proposal and that certain others were opposed.
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the CAB classified these truncated IATA documents as confiden-
tial."°
Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act of 19581 requires air
carriers to file all intercarrier agreements for approval of the CAB.
This section states that the Board shall disapprove intercarrier
agreements that are found to be adverse to the public interest or in
violation of the Act."2 By virtue of this provision, it is possible for
the Board to disapprove any IATA rate agreement including the
agreement that created the IATA rate-making conferences. Need-
less to say, the CAB has always utilized its powers under section
412 to approve IATA rate agreements and thereby to protect them
from the operation of United States antitrust laws.6
The CAB has never made an investigation into the reasonable-
ness of the IATA fares. Even the Board members admit that IATA
fares on all major international routes are prohibitively high."
According to the recent statistics of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization the spectacular improvement in the performance
of jet aircraft during the past decade has reduced the costs of
operation of world airlines by one-half. 5 The costs per ton-kilo-
meter flown, adjusted to the United States consumer price index,
have dropped from 28.3 cents in 1960 to 15.8 cents in 1970.66
Of course, the ICAO figures include the costs of the notoriously
inefficient airlines of the free world. Despite the sharp reduction
in cost, the IATA normal prices were increased several times dur-
6 CAB Order No. E-23120 (Jan. 13, 1966); CAB Letter to Carriers (July 16,
1968).
6149 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970).
2 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 412(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1970) pro-
vides: "The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement
, . * that it finds to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this
chapter .... "
G3Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970), provides
that agreement approved pursuant to section 1382 are "relieved from the opera-
tions of 'antitrust law.'"
64AII agreements approved by the Board are immune from antitrust laws.
See, e.g., CAB Order No. 72-3-105 (March 30, 1972) (Murphy and Minetti, dis-
senting); CAB Order No. 71-3-87 (March 16, 1971) (Murphy and Minetti, dis-
senting).
65A review of the Economic Situation of Air Transport, 1960-1970 at 42
(ICAO Circular 105-AT/26, April 1971).661d. at 41-42; see also The Montreal Star, June 29, 1971, at 21, for an
analysis of the ICAO study.6 7 E.g., Aer Lingus and Pakistan International.
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ing the last decade. For instance, the new peak season economy
roundtrip fare for New York-London is 21.4 per cent higher than
the 1962 level." Similarly, the economy fare for San Francisco-
Saigon is 15.4 per cent higher, and the Los Angeles-Hong Kong
fare is 13.3 per cent higher than their corresponding 1962 levels."
The actual operating costs of the United States carriers are
considerably less than their IATA counterparts. If the international
fares are brought into reasonable relationship with the costs of
United States carriers, the public would be able to travel at one-
half the price than they are now paying. For example, TWA's
total operating costs on the transatlantic division were less than
4.2 cents per revenue-passenger-mile for wide-bodied jets' in 1971.
The new IATA prices for New York-London are set at 12.1 cents
per mile for first class, 8.5 cents per mile for peak season economy
class, and 5.9 cents for peak 14/21 day excursion fare. 1 Likewise,
the new IATA fares for Los Angeles-Tokyo are 13.2 cents per
mile for first class, 8.1 cents per mile for economy, and 6.8 cents
for 14/21 day excursion, while it is possible for United States car-
riers to offer a fare of less than 4.5 cents per mile in the average."
It is clear that the existing IATA fares should be cut by one-half
in order to bring them within reasonable levels which approximate
the costs of operation. Strangely, the CAB position is that the
IATA fares are not adverse to the public interest within the mean-
ing of section 412 of the Act.
It should not be difficult for the CAB to realize that higher fares
inhibit the growth of air travel in general and the tourist industry
in particular. Only three per cent of the American public gets an
opportunity to travel abroad by air annually."" This small per-
centage of the population pays at least three billion dollars in
excess air fares, while at the same time, the rest of the population
is denied their constitutional right to travel at reasonable cost. The
present financial condition of the United States carriers should be
8 Calculated from published tariffs.
I9 1d.
706 Wide-Bodied Jets: Aircraft Operating Cost and Performance Report
(Bureau of Accounts and Statistics, CAB, 1972).
71 CAB Order No. 72-3-104 (March 30, 1972).
72 CAB Order No. 72-3-105 (March 30, 1972).
13 Miller, International Travel, Passenger Fares, and Other Transportation in
the U.S. Balance of Payments, 51 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 20 (1971).
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sufficient evidence to convince the CAB that higher fares are not
necessarily in the interest of even the carriers. For instance, the
transatlantic load factor of Pan American has fallen from 57.3
per cent in 1966 to less than fifty-one per cent in 1971," mostly
due to the recurrent IATA fare increases. ' In 1971, the trans-
atlantic airlines had sufficient vacancies to fill in excess of one
hundred Boeing-707s per day. Of this amount Pan American ac-
counted for more than thirty per cent. If the fares were reduced,
the traffic volume, and consequently the load factors of Pan Amer-
ican would be increased to a profitable level. When Lufthansa
recently tried to introduce lower air fares, however, Pan American
objected on the ground that the carrier may not be able to carry
the estimated thirty per cent additional traffic that would be gen-
erated by Lufthansa fare." The CAB did nothing to dissuade Pan
American from its opposition to lower fares. Instead, both the
CAB and the airlines asked the Congress for more statutory powers
to enable the CAB to cancel the so-called "uneconomically low
fares" that it believes inimical to the interests of United States
carriers. '
IATA's pervasive influence on the economic life of air carriers
has not only spelled disaster on the relatively efficient United States
air carriers but has also imposed a continuing economic burden
on overseas travelers. Apart from price-fixing for international
travel, IATA controls travel agents, sets private currency exchange
rates, opposes non-IATA competitors and determines the pitch and
width of seats in airplanes. 8 Moreover, IATA engages in price-
fixing for domestic air travel by prescribing the so-called propor-
tional fares that apply to domestic route segments connected to
international routes." The new IATA agreement on proportional
'
4 Air Carrier Traffic Statistics (CAB, Dec. 1966 and Dec. 1971).
'The carrier may disagree with this statement. There appears to be a definite
correlation, however, between the decline in load factor and fare increases.
" Transcript of the CAB meeting with officials of Pan American and Trans
World Airlines at 18 (Sept. 23, 1971).
' Hearings on S. 2423 Before the Subcomm. on the Regulation of Rates and
Practices of Air Carriers and Foreign Air Carriers of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 13-32, 195-225 (1972).
"See MANUAL OF IATA REsoLUTIONs (1972).
" For instance, a passenger traveling Chicago-New York-London, pays the
New York-London fare plus the proportional fare for Chicago-New York (forty-
19721
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fares for North America prescribes fares for 1,094 domestic city-
pairs."0 This intrusion of IATA's monopoly price-fixing practices
into domestic air transportation, as well as its other multifarious
activities, directly violate the provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act."1 ACAP repeatedly requested the CAB to restrain IATA from
many of its existing activities and practices.' When the CAB re-
fused to respond to these requests, an action was brought against
the CAB challenging the statutory authority and the constitutional
propriety of the Board's unholy alliance with the international
cartel."
The CAB regulation of rates and fares of scheduled airlines is
pro forma and perfunctory. It appears that consumers would be
better off if the airlines are deprived of the protection granted by
the CAB's rate regulation. The history and development of the
charter airlines adequately demonstrate that there is nothing more
beneficial to consumers than price competition controlled by normal
market forces. Price competition of the charter airlines over the
years has not produced any corporate casualties, and at the same
time the public and consumers were afforded the benefit of low-
cost charter travel.
HII. CONCLUSION
Instead of spending its time and resources on the ritualistic
regulation of rates and fares of certificated air carriers it is sug-
gested that the Board should certificate and regulate the indirect
air carriers, such as tour operators and charter consolidators. The
total failure of the Board to regulate indirect air carriers has
two dollars) instead of the regular domestic fares for Chicago-New York (58.90
dollars).
8' ATA Resolution 015 (Feb. 2, 1972).
" E.g., under 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970), the CAB and domestic carriers
have exclusive authority to fix domestic fares. However, TATA proportional fares
are fixed by United States and foreign air carriers.
82 In CAB Order No. 72-3-104 (March 30, 1972), ACAP's request that the
CAB disapprove IATA proportional fares was denied. ACAP subsequently filed
a petition for review of this order. Civil Action No. 72-1491 (D.D.C. filed May
30, 1972).
8 See ACAP v. C.A.B., Civil Action No. 2188-71 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 1, 1971).
84 Statement of International Air Transportation Policy of the United States,
6 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 804 (June 22, 1970); 63 Dep't
State Bull. 86 (July-Dec. 1970).
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created a state of lawlessness and chaos in the air tour business,
causing considerable hardship and agony to the tourists at large."
This situation became manifest during recent years when thousands
of passengers were stranded in foreign countries because of the
failure of tour operators to furnish the promised transportation and
related services." Even though the Board classified the tour oper-
ators as indirect air carriers, they are relieved from the various
provisions of the Federal Aviation Act by means of a blanket ex-
emption granted by the Board." As a result, the tour operators are
free to engage in the furnishing of air transportation without specific
authorization from the Board, to charge their customers arbitrary
prices, to make unreasonable profits, or even to abscond with
monies collected from passengers.8 The Board has no information
concerning the number of tour operators engaged in indirect air
transportation, their assets and liabilities, or the identity of persons
who own or control them. Recently ACAP has petitioned the
CAB to certificate and regulate indirect air carriers engaged in
transportation of passengers."'
An assessment of the CAB's delinquencies in rate regulation
makes a strong case against the continuance of the CAB's juris-
diction over the rates and fares of scheduled airlines. However, at
this time, this author does not subscribe to the views of those who
advocate the abolition of the CAB itself." There is no question
that the Board's view of regulation are fundamentally defective
and that they are inconsistent with the present day realities. Never-
theless, experience indicates that persistent public pressure could
catalyze the Board to make introspective changes in many of its
established procedures and practices, and to update its regulatory
process. If the changes occur, the Board would then be able to
justify its own existence.
"See, e.g., testimony of William Dale, Hearings on S. 2577 Before the Sub-
comm. to Provide for Regulation of the Travel Agency Industry of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 21-29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on S. 2577].
"See testimony of the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Hearings
on S. 2577 at 49-78.
"
7 CAB Eco. Reg. § 296.12(b), IA CCH Fed. Av. L. Rep. 5 11,570 (1971).
8 For details, see ACAP petition, CAB Docket No. 24204 (Feb. 4, 1972).
"Id.
The Report of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization
(1970), strongly urges the abolition of the CAB.
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